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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 More than twenty years ago, Jermont Cox was 
convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 
County of first-degree murder and related charges.  In 2000, 
he filed a petition in the U.S. District Court for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  The District Court dismissed the petition in 
2004, finding that all but one of Cox’s claims were 
procedurally defaulted due to counsel’s failure to pursue them 
in Cox’s initial-review post-conviction proceeding in state 
court and that the one preserved claim lacked merit.  We 
affirmed.  In 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States 
decided Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), which 
announced an exception to longstanding precedent and found 
that, under certain circumstances, and for purposes of habeas 
review, post-conviction counsel’s failure to raise ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims could excuse a procedural 
default of those claims.  Within three months of that decision, 
Cox filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure for relief from the 2004 order dismissing 
his habeas petition.  The District Court denied the motion, 
finding that the intervening change in law occasioned by 
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Martinez, “without more,” did not provide cause for relief. 
 We agree that, for relief to be granted under Rule 
60(b)(6), “more” than the concededly important change of 
law wrought by Martinez is required—indeed, much “more” 
is required.  Ultimately, as with any motion for 60(b)(6) 
relief, what must be shown are “extraordinary circumstances 
where, without such relief, an extreme and unexpected 
hardship would occur.”  Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 
138, 140 (3d Cir. 1993); accord Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 
536 F.3d 244, 255 (3d Cir. 2008).  But what those 
extraordinary circumstances would—or could—be in the 
context of Martinez was neither offered to the District Court 
by the parties nor discussed by the Court, although, to be 
sure, at that point there had been little post-Martinez case law 
to inform any such discussion. 
 
 We will vacate the order of the District Court and 
remand to provide the Court the opportunity to consider 
Cox’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion with the benefit of whatever 
guidance it may glean from this Opinion and from any 
additional briefing it may order.  We note at the outset that 
one of the critical factors in the equitable and case-dependent 
nature of the 60(b)(6) analysis on which we now embark is 
whether the 60(b)(6) motion under review was brought within 
a reasonable time of the Martinez decision.  See Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 60(c)(1).  It is not disputed that the timing of the 60(b)(6) 
motion before us—filed, as it was, roughly ninety days after 
Martinez—is close enough to that decision to be deemed 
reasonable.  Still, though not an issue before us, it is 
important that we acknowledge—and, indeed, we warn—that, 
unless a petitioner’s motion for 60(b)(6) relief based on 
Martinez was brought within a reasonable time of that 
decision, the motion will fail. 
 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Recognizing that more than twenty years of procedural 
history has brought us to this point, it is, nonetheless, 
important that that history be recounted.  We will attempt to 
be succinct, if not laserlike, in our recitation. 
 
 On October 28, 1993, following a bench trial before 
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the Hon. Carolyn Engel Temin of the Court of Common Pleas 
of Philadelphia County, Cox was convicted of first-degree 
murder, criminal conspiracy, and possession of an instrument 
of crime in connection with the July 19, 1992 shooting death 
of Lawrence Davis, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
 
 In a statement he gave to the police at the time of his 
arrest, Cox confessed to shooting Davis, but said that the 
shooting had been accidental.  He and a friend, Larry Lee, he 
said, had gone to a drug house operated by Lee.  While they 
were outside drinking, Lee got into a dispute with Davis that 
escalated into a physical altercation.  At some point, Lee 
handed Cox a gun that was already cocked.  Cox shot twice, 
hitting Davis, and then handed the gun back to Lee.  
According to Cox, he later told family members that the 
shooting had been an accident. 
 
 To prove at trial that Cox had the requisite intent for 
first-degree murder, the Commonwealth presented the 
testimony of Kimberly Little, an eyewitness.  Little testified 
that Cox and Lee worked for a drug organization that was run 
out of an apartment in her building: Cox was a “lookout” and 
Lee supplied the operation’s drugs.  (A. 31.)  On the night of 
Davis’ death, Little saw from her window an argument erupt 
between Davis and Lee.  According to Little, Cox then exited 
a local bar with a six-pack of beer, approached the two men, 
placed the six-pack on the hood of Lee’s nearby car, retrieved 
a gun from the car, walked to within four feet of Davis, and 
shot him three times.  Cox stopped to drink a beer, and he and 
Lee left in Lee’s car. 
 
 The Commonwealth’s other witnesses were Kimberly 
Little’s sister, Mary Little; the medical examiner; and a 
ballistics expert.  Mary Little confirmed that Cox and Lee 
were neighborhood drug dealers and that she saw them drive 
off together after the shooting.  The medical examiner 
asserted that Davis had four wounds caused by at least three 
bullets, and the ballistics expert explained that it was unlikely 
the shooting was accidental given the number of shots fired. 
 
 Trial counsel filed post-verdict motions on Cox’s 
behalf.  Cox also filed a motion pro se alleging trial counsel’s 
 5 
ineffectiveness and requesting the appointment of new 
counsel.  In February of 1994, Judge Temin held a hearing on 
the post-verdict motions.  At the hearing, Cox testified in 
support of his pro se motion and outlined trial counsel’s 
alleged failings: trial counsel (1) failed to present testimony 
from various character witnesses; (2) failed to find a witness, 
identified by Cox, who would have testified that “guys from 
the neighborhood” forced Kimberly Little to give a false 
statement to the police, (S.A. 47); (3) failed to review 
paperwork that Cox provided him; and (4) dissuaded Cox 
from taking the stand in his own defense.  In response, trial 
counsel stated that he found himself in “a very untenable 
position” and asked that he be permitted to withdraw.  (S.A. 
59.)  Judge Temin denied the request as well as the pro se 
motion, finding Cox’s claims of ineffectiveness to lack merit.  
She later denied the counseled post-verdict motions. 
 
 Cox, still represented by trial counsel, appealed his 
conviction, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and 
the admission of evidence relating to uncharged drug activity.  
In June of 1995, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed 
the judgment of sentence.  Cox then filed a pro se petition for 
allocatur in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, raising claims 
of trial counsel’s ineffective assistance at the trial and on 
appeal.  New counsel was appointed for Cox and submitted a 
supplemental allocatur petition.  The Supreme Court denied 
allocatur in April of 1996.1 
                                                 
 1 By that time, Cox had also been convicted of the 
1992 first-degree murders of Roosevelt Watson and Terence 
Stewart, both of whom he aided Lee in killing.  Cox was 
sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Watson and 
death for the murder of Stewart.  His conviction for 
murdering Davis was found to be an aggravating factor in 
support of his capital sentence.  See Commonwealth v. Cox, 
983 A.2d 666, 673-75 (Pa. 2009).  Those convictions have 
spawned federal habeas proceedings that are before the 
District Court, and Cox has filed new PCRA petitions 
challenging his convictions on all three murders on the basis 
of new ballistics evidence.  His habeas petitions relating to 
the Watson and Stewart cases have been stayed pending those 
PCRA proceedings. 
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 The following month, Cox filed a pro se petition under 
Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 9541-9546.  The attorney who had 
represented Cox in his petition to the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court was again appointed to represent Cox in his collateral 
review proceeding under PCRA.  Counsel filed an amended 
PCRA petition asserting claims of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel.2  Judge Temin, sitting as the PCRA court, held a 
hearing at which PCRA counsel chose to proceed on only one 
of the multiple claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness: 
failure to impeach the Littles with their criminal records and 
motive to curry favor with the Commonwealth to gain 
leniency in their own cases. 
 
 On August 28, 1998, Judge Temin denied post-
conviction relief, finding that Cox had not been prejudiced by 
trial counsel’s failure to impeach Kimberly and Mary Little 
with their criminal records because evidence aside from their 
testimony established his guilt.  The Superior Court affirmed 
in July of 1999 and the Supreme Court denied allocatur in 
December of that year.  Cox filed a second PCRA petition pro 
se, alleging ineffective assistance claims against trial and 
PCRA counsel.  Judge Temin dismissed the petition as 
untimely, and the Superior Court affirmed after Cox failed to 
file a brief. 
 
 In October of 2000, Cox, now represented by the 
Federal Defender, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
in the U.S. District Court.  The petition raised eight grounds 
for relief: (1) six claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
                                                 
 2 The counseled PCRA petition claimed that trial 
counsel had provided constitutionally deficient representation 
when he failed to impeach the Little sisters with (1) the fact 
that they had charges pending against them when they first 
gave statements to the police, were eventually convicted of 
lesser charges, and were on probation at the time of trial; (2) 
their alleged familial relationship to the murder victim, Davis; 
and (3) a prior inconsistent statement by Kimberly Little.  
Trial counsel was also allegedly deficient for failing to 
present evidence of Cox’s lawful employment. 
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counsel; (2) one violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963); and (3) a claim of cumulative error.  In July of 2003, 
a magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation 
(“R&R”) in which he determined that the ineffective 
assistance claims abandoned by PCRA counsel before the 
PCRA court, as well as the Brady and cumulative error 
claims, were procedurally defaulted.  He reviewed the 
remaining claim of ineffective assistance—trial counsel’s 
failure to impeach the Littles with their criminal records—and 
concluded that the Superior Court’s decision rejecting that 
claim was neither “contrary to” nor an “unreasonable 
application” of established federal law.  (A. 44-47 (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).)  Cox filed objections to the R&R, 
arguing that PCRA counsel’s unilateral decision to abandon 
claims constituted cause to overcome the procedural default 
bar.  In August of 2004, the District Court rejected Cox’s 
objections, adopted the R&R, and dismissed the habeas 
petition.3  We affirmed on appeal.  Cox v. Horn, 174 F. App’x 
84 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
 Six years later, on June 20, 2012, Cox filed a motion 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) seeking 
relief from the District Court’s order of dismissal due to the 
intervening change in procedural law occasioned by the 
March 20, 2012 decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Martinez v. Ryan.  The Court held in Martinez that, 
under certain circumstances, error by post-conviction counsel 
can constitute cause to overcome the procedural default of 
                                                 
 3 The District Court granted a certificate of 
appealability on two issues: (1) whether the Superior Court’s 
resolution of Cox’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
based on trial counsel’s failure to impeach Kimberly Little 
with evidence of her criminal record, “resulted in a decision 
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 
of, clearly established federal law” and (2) “whether the 
Superior Court’s failure to remand to the trial court to 
conduct a hearing to determine whether [Cox] wanted to 
proceed pro se or with counsel establishe[d] cause to 
overcome a procedural default” of his other claims.  Cox v. 
Horn, No. 00-5188 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2004) (order granting 
certificate of appealability). 
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claims alleging trial counsel’s ineffective assistance.  Cox 
argued that it was only due to PCRA counsel’s ineffective 
assistance at the initial PCRA proceeding that his claims of 
ineffectiveness against trial counsel had been abandoned and 
were now procedurally defaulted. 
 
 On May 23, 2013, the District Court denied Cox’s 
motion, finding that “Martinez’s change of law, without 
more,” was not cause for relief.  (A. 5.)  In a separate July 2, 
2013 order, the District Court issued a certificate of 
appealability on the “legal question” of “whether the change 
in law resulting from Martinez constitutes extraordinary 
circumstances that would warrant relief” under Rule 60(b)(6).  
(A. 6.) 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254.  We have appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. 
 
 We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s 
denial of a motion under Rule 60(b)(6).  Brown v. Phila. 
Hous. Auth., 350 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2003).  A district 
court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision upon a 
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an erroneous conclusion of 
law, or an improper application of law to fact.  Morris v. 
Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Martinez Rule 
 When reviewing a state prisoner’s petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, a federal court normally cannot review a 
federal claim for post-conviction relief that has already been 
rejected by a state court on the basis of an independent and 
adequate state procedural rule.  Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 
1120, 1127 (2011); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 
(1991).  A petitioner may obtain federal review of a 
procedurally defaulted claim, however, if he demonstrates 
cause for the default and prejudice arising from the violation 
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of federal law.  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1316 (citing Coleman, 
501 U.S. at 750). 
 
 When Cox’s habeas petition was initially under review 
by the District Court, the governing rule, as recognized in 
Coleman, was that error by counsel in state post-conviction 
proceedings could not serve as “cause” sufficient to excuse 
procedural default of a petitioner’s claim.  See Coleman, 501 
U.S. at 752-54; Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 522 & n.16 
(3d Cir. 2002).  The Supreme Court carved out a significant 
exception to that rule nearly eight years after Cox’s petition 
was denied when, in 2012, it decided Martinez. 
 
 In Martinez, the Supreme Court held that, where state 
law requires a prisoner to raise claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel in a collateral proceeding, rather 
than on direct review, a procedural default of those claims 
will not bar their review by a federal habeas court if three 
conditions are met: (a) the default was caused by ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel or the absence of 
counsel (b) in the initial-review collateral proceeding (i.e., the 
first collateral proceeding in which the claim could be heard) 
and (c) the underlying claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness is 
“substantial,” meaning “the claim has some merit,” analogous 
to the substantiality requirement for a certificate of 
appealability.  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318-20.  The Court 
adopted this “equitable ruling” for several reasons.  Id. at 
1319.  First, “[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel 
at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice system” vital to 
ensuring the fairness of an adversarial trial.  Id. at 1317.  
Second, a prisoner cannot realistically vindicate that right 
through a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
without “an effective attorney” to aid in the investigation and 
presentation of the claim.  Id.  Finally, if the lack of effective 
counsel in an initial-review collateral proceeding could not 
excuse the federal procedural default bar, no court—state or 
federal—would ever review the defendant’s ineffective 
assistance claims, given that they were first brought in that 
collateral proceeding.  Id. at 1316. 
 
 The majority in Martinez noted that it was 
propounding a “narrow,” id. at 1315, “limited qualification” 
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to Coleman, id. at 1319.  Even so, what the Court did was 
significant.  See, e.g., id. at 1327 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing Martinez as “a radical alteration of . . . habeas 
jurisprudence”); Lopez v. Ryan, 678 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 
2012) (“Martinez constitutes a remarkable—if ‘limited,’—
development in the Court’s equitable jurisprudence.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 
 In Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013), issued 
the following Term, the Supreme Court clarified that the 
Martinez rule applied not only to states that expressly denied 
permission to raise ineffective assistance claims on direct 
appeal (such as Arizona, which Martinez addressed), but also 
to states in which it was “virtually impossible,” as a practical 
matter, to assert an ineffective assistance claim before 
collateral review.  Id. at 1915 (quotation marks omitted).  
Texas law, at issue in Trevino, ostensibly permitted (though it 
did not require) criminal defendants to raise ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims on direct appeal.  In 
practice, however, Texas’ criminal justice system “[did] not 
offer most defendants a meaningful opportunity” to do so.  Id. 
at 1921.  As the Texas courts themselves had observed, trial 
records often lacked information necessary to substantiate 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, and motion 
filing deadlines, coupled with the lack of readily available 
transcripts, generally precluded raising an ineffective 
assistance claim in a post-trial motion.  Moreover, the Texas 
courts had invited, and even directed, defendants to wait to 
pursue such claims until collateral review.  The Court 
“conclude[d] that where, as [in Texas], state procedural 
framework, by reason of its design and operation, makes it 
highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a 
meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, [the] holding in 
Martinez applies.”  Id. 
 
B. Cox’s Rule 60(b)(6) Motion 
 Rule 60(b)(6) is a catch-all provision that authorizes a 
court to grant relief from a final judgment for “any . . . 
reason” other than those listed elsewhere in the Rule.  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 60(b)(6).  As we noted at the outset, courts are to 
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dispense their broad powers under 60(b)(6) only in 
“extraordinary circumstances where, without such relief, an 
extreme and unexpected hardship would occur.”  Sawka, 989 
F.2d at 140. 
 
 Ninety-two days after the Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Martinez, Cox filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(6), 
seeking to reopen his federal habeas proceeding based on the 
“significant change in procedural law” caused by the 
decision.  (A. 74.)  In ruling on Cox’s motion, the District 
Court noted that neither the Supreme Court nor our Court had 
decided whether the rule announced in Martinez constituted 
an “extraordinary circumstance” sufficient in and of itself to 
support a 60(b)(6) motion and observed a divide among the 
courts of appeals that had addressed the issue.  The Court 
explained that the Fifth Circuit, in Adams v. Thaler, 679 F.3d 
312, 320 (5th Cir. 2012), held that “a change in law, including 
the change announced in Martinez, can never be the basis of 
60(b) relief.”  (A. 4.)  In contrast, it said, the Ninth Circuit 
had left open the possibility that Martinez, assessed together 
with other factors on a case-by-case basis, could justify 60(b) 
relief.  (A. 4 (citing Lopez, 678 F.3d 1131).)4  Joining what it 
viewed to be the position of every other district court in our 
Circuit to have opined on the impact of Martinez, the Court 
“adopt[ed] the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit to hold that 
Martinez’s change of law, without more, [was] insufficient to 
warrant relief under 60(b)(6).”  (A. 4-5.) 
 
 Although we agree with the District Court’s ultimate 
conclusion that Martinez, without more, is an insufficient 
basis for reopening a long-since-dismissed habeas petition, 
such as Cox’s, we cannot endorse the path it took to arrive at 
that conclusion.  For one thing, Adams is not concordant with 
our precedent applying Rule 60(b)(6).  For another, we cannot 
determine from what it wrote whether the Court considered 
factors—if any there be—beyond Martinez’s jurisprudential 
change in assessing Cox’s request for relief.  To the extent the 
Court “adopt[ed] the reasoning” of Adams and there stopped 
its inquiry, it did not employ the full, case-specific analysis 
                                                 
 4 In Lopez, the Ninth Circuit also denied Rule 60(b)(6) 
relief.  678 F.3d at 1137. 
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we require when faced with a 60(b)(6) motion, although, as 
we have already noted, little was offered by the parties in that 
regard. 
 
 1. Whether Martinez Is Itself an Extraordinary  
  Circumstance 
  
 Because it was a focal point of the District Court’s 
reasoning, we begin with a discussion of the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in Adams v. Thaler.  In Adams, as in this case, the 
district court dismissed a habeas petitioner’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims as procedurally defaulted under 
state law, finding that errors by state post-conviction counsel 
could not excuse the default.  Following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Martinez, the petitioner, who had been sentenced 
to death in Texas state court, filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion 
seeking relief from the order dismissing his habeas petition.  
The petitioner pointed to several factors that, in combination, 
established “extraordinary circumstances” and entitled him to 
60(b)(6) relief: (1) the “‘jurisprudential sea change’ in federal 
habeas corpus law” occasioned by Martinez; (2) the fact that 
his case had resulted in a death sentence; and (3) “the 
equitable imperative that the true merit” of his claims be 
heard.  Adams, 679 F.3d at 319.  He also filed a motion for a 
stay of execution pending the district court’s resolution of his 
60(b)(6) motion.  The district court granted the stay of 
execution. 
 
 The Fifth Circuit vacated that order as an abuse of the 
district court’s discretion, given that the petitioner had not 
shown a likelihood of success on his Rule 60(b)(6) motion.  
The court determined that the 60(b)(6) motion would not 
succeed because, under Fifth Circuit precedent, “[a] change in 
decisional law after entry of judgment does not constitute 
exceptional circumstances and is not alone grounds for relief 
from a final judgment.”  Id. (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  That proposition flowed from prior 
Fifth Circuit cases, which stated that “changes in decisional 
law . . . do not constitute the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ 
required for granting Rule 60(b)(6) relief.”  Hess v. Cockrell, 
281 F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 2002); accord Hernandez v. 
Thaler, 630 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  
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Concluding that Martinez was “simply a change in decisional 
law” and its development of procedural default principles was 
“hardly extraordinary,” the Adams court denied 60(b)(6) 
relief without examining any of the petitioner’s individual 
circumstances.  Adams, 679 F.3d at 320 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
 Adams does not square with our approach to Rule 
60(b)(6). 
 
 As an initial matter, we have not embraced any 
categorical rule that a change in decisional law is never an 
adequate basis for Rule 60(b)(6) relief.  Rather, we have 
consistently articulated a more qualified position: that 
intervening changes in the law rarely justify relief from final 
judgments under 60(b)(6).  See, e.g., Reform Party of 
Allegheny Cnty. v. Allegheny Cnty. Dep’t of Elections, 174 
F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“‘[I]ntervening 
developments in the law by themselves rarely constitute the 
extraordinary circumstances required for relief under Rule 
60(b)(6).’” (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239 
(1997)) (emphasis added)); Morris, 187 F.3d at 341 (same).  
Stated somewhat differently, we have not foreclosed the 
possibility that a change in controlling precedent, even 
standing alone, might give reason for 60(b)(6) relief.  See 
Wilson v. Fenton, 684 F.2d 249, 251 (3d Cir. 1982) (per 
curiam) (“A decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
States or a Court of Appeals may provide the extraordinary 
circumstances for granting a Rule 60(b)(6) motion . . . .”). 
 
 Even if there is not much daylight between the “never” 
position of the Fifth Circuit and the “rarely” position that we 
have staked out, Adams differs from our precedent in yet 
another significant respect: its failure to consider the full set 
of facts and circumstances attendant to the Rule 60(b)(6) 
motion under review.  The Fifth Circuit in Adams ended its 
analysis after determining that Martinez’s change in the law 
was an insufficient basis for 60(b)(6) relief and did not 
consider whether the capital nature of the petitioner’s case or 
any other factor might counsel that Martinez be accorded 
heightened significance in his case or provide a reason or 
reasons for granting 60(b)(6) relief.  Indeed, the court did not 
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address in any meaningful way the petitioner’s claim that he 
was not offering Martinez “alone” as a basis for relief.  In 
Diaz v. Stephens, 731 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2013), the Fifth 
Circuit later acknowledged that Adams and its other precedent 
had not cited additional equitable factors “as bearing on the 
analysis of extraordinary circumstances under Rule 
60(b)(6).”5  See also id. at 376 n.1.  The fact that the 
petitioner’s 60(b)(6) motion was predicated chiefly on a post-
judgment change in the law was the singular, dispositive issue 
for the Adams court. 
 
 We have not taken that route.  Instead, we have long 
employed a flexible, multifactor approach to Rule 60(b)(6) 
motions, including those built upon a post-judgment change 
in the law, that takes into account all the particulars of a 
movant’s case.  See Coltec Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 
262, 274 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting, in the context of a 60(b)(6) 
analysis, the propriety of “explicit[ly]” considering “equitable 
factors” in addition to a change in law); Lasky v. Cont’l 
Prods. Corp., 804 F.2d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing 
multiple factors a district court may consider in assessing a 
motion under 60(b)(6)).6  The fundamental point of 60(b) is 
that it provides “a grand reservoir of equitable power to do 
justice in a particular case.”  Hall v. Cmty. Mental Health 
Ctr., 772 F.2d 42, 46 (3d Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  A movant, of course, bears the burden of 
establishing entitlement to such equitable relief, which, again, 
will be granted only under extraordinary circumstances.  
Mayberry v. Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159, 1163 (3d Cir. 1977).  
But a district court must consider the full measure of any 
properly presented facts and circumstances attendant to the 
movant’s request. 
 
                                                 
 5 The court in Diaz assumed, for the sake of argument, 
that a district court may consider several equitable factors in 
the Rule 60(b)(6) context, but found that consideration of 
those factors in Diaz’s case did not entitle him to 60(b)(6) 
relief.  731 F.3d at 377-78. 
 6 Notably, the factors outlined in Lasky parallel the 
equitable factors cited by the Fifth Circuit in Diaz as being of 
questionable relevance to Rule 60(b)(6) motions. 
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 The Commonwealth appellees contend that Gonzalez 
v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), effectively displaced our 
flexible approach in the habeas context and precludes Rule 
60(b)(6) relief based on a change in law, including Martinez.  
In Gonzalez, the district court dismissed a petitioner’s habeas 
petition as barred by the statute of limitations of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).  It found that the limitations period was 
not tolled while his second state post-conviction motion was 
pending because the motion was untimely and successive and, 
therefore, had not been “properly filed.”  Id. at 527.  The 
Eleventh Circuit denied a certificate of appealability and the 
petitioner did not seek subsequent review of that decision.  
Several months later, the Supreme Court rejected the district 
court’s reasoning in Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000), and 
held that an application for state post-conviction relief can be 
“properly filed” even if it was dismissed by the state as 
procedurally barred.  The petitioner then filed a 60(b)(6) 
motion citing Artuz as an extraordinary circumstance.  The 
Supreme Court rejected his argument.  Noting that the 
circumstances warranting 60(b) relief would “rarely occur in 
the habeas context,” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535, the Court 
opined that “not every interpretation of the federal statutes 
setting forth the requirements for habeas provides cause for 
reopening cases long since final,” id. at 536.  It was “hardly 
extraordinary” that the district court’s interpretation of 
AEDPA, which was correct under the Eleventh Circuit’s 
then-governing precedent, was subsequently rejected in a 
different case.  Id. at 536. 
 
 The Eleventh Circuit, describing Gonzalez, has 
observed that, in that opinion, “the U.S. Supreme Court . . . 
told us that a change in decisional law is insufficient to create 
the ‘extraordinary circumstance’ necessary to invoke Rule 
60(b)(6).”  Arthur v. Thomas, 739 F.3d 611, 631 (11th Cir. 
2014) (citing Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535-38).  Relying on 
Gonzalez, the Eleventh Circuit in Arthur, just as the Fifth 
Circuit in Adams, went on to hold that “the change in the 
decisional law affected by the Martinez rule is not an 
‘extraordinary circumstance’ sufficient to invoke Rule 
60(b)(6).”  Id.  The Commonwealth appellees cite the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in an effort to persuade us that, in 
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light of Gonzalez, we should abandon our case-by-case 
approach to 60(b)(6) motions. 
 
 We are not persuaded.  We believe that the Eleventh 
Circuit extracts too broad a principle from Gonzalez, which 
does not answer the question before us.  Gonzalez did not say 
that a new interpretation of the federal habeas statutes—much 
less, the equitable principles invoked to aid their 
enforcement—is always insufficient to sustain a Rule 
60(b)(6) motion.  Gonzalez merely highlights, in action, the 
position of both the Supreme Court and this Court that 
“[i]ntervening developments in the law by themselves rarely 
constitute the extraordinary circumstances required for relief 
under Rule 60(b)(6).”  Agostini, 521 U.S. at 239 (emphasis 
added); Morris, 187 F.3d at 341.  And, to be clear, the 
Gonzalez Court examined the individual circumstances of the 
petitioner’s case to see whether relief was appropriate, 
concluding that relief was not warranted given the petitioner’s 
“lack of diligence in pursuing review [in his own case] of the 
statute-of-limitations issue” eventually addressed in Artuz.  
Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 537.  For that matter, even after 
categorically pronouncing that Martinez’s change in the law 
could not sustain a 60(b)(6) motion, the Eleventh Circuit in 
Arthur briefly considered (and rejected) “other factors” cited 
by the movant, including the capital nature of his case, as 
justification for 60(b)(6) relief in the wake of Martinez.7  
                                                 
 7 At least three other courts of appeals have similarly 
assessed a variety of factors on a case-by-case basis when 
deciding whether to grant a habeas petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(6) 
motion based on Martinez and Trevino.  See Nash v. Hepp, 
740 F.3d 1075, 1078-79 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that, per 
Gonzalez and prior Seventh Circuit precedent, Martinez’s 
change in law could not justify 60(b)(6) relief, but analyzing 
the specific circumstances of the petitioner’s case, including 
his lack of diligence and his prior opportunity to raise the 
defaulted claims); McGuire v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. 
Inst., 738 F.3d 741, 750-52 (6th Cir. 2013) (denying 60(b)(6) 
motion after concluding that Trevino did not impart new 
constitutional rights, Trevino’s change of the law was the sole 
basis for the motion, and its rule arguably did not apply to the 
petitioner’s claims); Lopez, 678 F.3d at 1135-37 (applying a 
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Arthur, 739 F.3d at 633. 
 
 We, therefore, believe that our case-dependent 
analysis, fully in line with Rule 60(b)(6)’s equitable 
moorings, retains vitality post-Gonzalez, and we do not adopt 
a per se rule that a change in decisional law, even in the 
habeas context, is inadequate, either standing alone or in 
tandem with other factors, to invoke relief from a final 
judgment under 60(b)(6).  The District Court abused its 
discretion when it based its decision solely on the reasoning 
of Adams and failed to consider how, if at all, the capital 
aspect of this case or any other factor highlighted by the 
parties would figure into its 60(b)(6) analysis.  We will 
remand to give it the opportunity to conduct that equitable 
evaluation now. 
 
 2. Rule 60(b)(6) Analysis 
 The grant or denial of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is an 
equitable matter left, in the first instance, to the discretion of a 
district court.  We offer, however, the following thoughts to 
aid the District Court in its further review of Cox’s motion. 
 
 First, and importantly, we agree with the District Court 
that the jurisprudential change rendered by Martinez, without 
more, does not entitle a habeas petitioner to Rule 60(b)(6) 
relief.  To be sure, Martinez’s change to the federal rules of 
procedural default, though “limited,” was “remarkable.”  
Lopez, 678 F.3d at 1136 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Martinez sharply altered Coleman’s well-settled application 
of the procedural default bar and altered the law of every 
circuit.  The rule adopted in Martinez was also important, 
crafted, as it was, to ensure that fundamental constitutional 
claims receive review by at least one court. 
 
 Even so, Martinez did not announce a new 
constitutional rule or right for criminal defendants, but rather 
an equitable rule prescribing and expanding the opportunity 
for review of their Sixth Amendment claims.  See Martinez, 
                                                                                                             
non-exhaustive, six-factor test to determine whether to grant 
60(b)(6) motion predicated on Martinez).   
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132 S. Ct. at 1319; Arthur, 739 F.3d at 629; McGuire, 738 
F.3d at 750-51; Buenrostro v. United States, 697 F.3d 1137, 
1139-40 (9th Cir. 2012) (published order).  A post-judgment 
change in the law on constitutional grounds is not, perforce, a 
reason to reopen a final judgment.  See Coltec Indus., 280 
F.3d at 276 (affirming denial of Rule 60(b)(6) motion even 
though law on which judgment based declared 
unconstitutional); Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trs. of UMWA 
Combined Benefits Fund, 249 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2001).  
Much less does an equitable change in procedural law, even 
one in service of vindicating a constitutional right, demand a 
grant of 60(b)(6) relief. 
 
 We also hasten to point out that the merits of a 
petitioner’s underlying ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
can affect whether relief based on Martinez is warranted.  It is 
appropriate for a district court, when ruling on a Rule 
60(b)(6) motion where the merits of the ineffective assistance 
claim were never considered prior to judgment, to assess the 
merits of that claim.  See Lasky, 804 F.2d at 256 n.10.  After 
all, the Martinez exception to procedural default applies only 
where the petitioner demonstrates ineffective assistance by 
post-conviction counsel, as well as a “substantial” claim of 
ineffective assistance at trial.  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318.  
When 60(b)(6) is the vehicle through which Martinez is to be 
given effect, the claim may well need be particularly 
substantial to militate in favor of equitable relief.8  A court 
                                                 
 
8 Of course, the procedural default exception 
announced in Martinez applies only in states where 
ineffective assistance claims, either expressly or as a matter 
of practicality, could not have been raised on direct appeal.  
Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1914-15.  In Commonwealth v. Grant, 
813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002), Pennsylvania decided to defer 
consideration of ineffective assistance of counsel claims to 
collateral review, making Martinez applicable to its criminal 
procedural system.  At the time Cox’s direct appeal and 
PCRA proceeding were being adjudicated by the 
Pennsylvania courts, however, Pennsylvania required a 
criminal defendant to raise ineffective assistance claims at the 
earliest stage of proceedings during which he was no longer 
represented by the allegedly ineffective lawyer, for example, 
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the post-trial motions phase or direct appeal.  Id. at 729; 
Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 372 A.2d 687, 695 & n.6 (Pa. 
1977).  The District Court determined that, because Cox was 
represented by the same attorney at trial and on direct appeal 
to the Superior Court, his PCRA proceeding presented the 
first opportunity to raise an ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claim and Martinez, therefore, applied. 
 The Commonwealth appellees argue that Martinez 
does not apply to pre-Grant Pennsylvania and that, in any 
event, Cox availed himself of the opportunity to raise 
ineffective assistance claims before the trial court and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  We do not decide whether, as 
a general matter, Pennsylvania’s pre-Grant legal landscape 
falls within the ambit of the Martinez rule.  We note simply 
that appellees have not established why the District Court 
erred in concluding that, under the pre-Grant procedural 
paradigm, defendants who, like Cox, were represented by the 
same counsel at trial and on direct appeal did not have a 
realistic opportunity to raise an ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claim until collateral review.  Extant Pennsylvania 
precedent made clear that Cox was not obligated to assert 
such a claim until trial counsel had been relieved of his 
representation.  Cox was entitled to rely on that guidance, 
and, therefore, did not have to raise his ineffective assistance 
claims until PCRA review.  See Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1919-
20; Sutton v. Carpenter, 745 F.3d 787, 793-94 (6th Cir. 
2014). 
 It is true that trial counsel no longer represented Cox in 
his petition for allocatur to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  
Given the “unlikely and unpredictable” manner in which 
allocatur is granted by that court, however, a petition for 
allocatur had never been seen as the first opportunity to raise 
a claim of ineffective assistance.  Commonwealth v. Moore, 
805 A.2d 1212, 1223 (Pa. 2002) (Castille, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part).  In addition, a party may not 
present new claims in a petition for allocatur.  Pa. R. App. P. 
302(a).  Cox’s trial counsel did not raise claims of his own 
ineffective assistance before the Superior Court—something 
he could not do, in any event, see Commonwealth v. Green, 
709 A.2d 382, 384 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth v. Dancer, 331 
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need not provide a remedy under 60(b)(6) for claims of 
dubious merit that only weakly establish ineffective 
assistance by trial or post-conviction counsel. 
 
 Furthermore,  courts must heed the Supreme Court’s 
observation—whether descriptive or prescriptive—that Rule 
60(b)(6) relief in the habeas context, especially based on a 
change in federal procedural law, will be rare.  Gonzalez, 545 
U.S. at 535-36 & n.9.  Principles of finality and comity, as 
expressed through AEDPA and habeas jurisprudence, dictate 
that federal courts pay ample respect to states’ criminal 
judgments and weigh against disturbing those judgments via 
60(b) motions.  In that vein, a district court reviewing a 
habeas petitioner’s 60(b)(6) motion may consider whether the 
conviction and initial federal habeas proceeding were only 
recently completed or ended years ago.  Considerations of 
repose and finality become stronger the longer a decision has 
been settled.  See id. at 536-37 (cautioning against 60(b)(6) 
relief in “cases long since final” and “long-ago dismissals”); 
id. at 542 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In cases where 
significant time has elapsed between a habeas judgment and 
the relevant change in procedural law, it would be within a 
district court’s discretion to leave such a judgment in 
repose.”).  Here, Cox’s direct appeal was decided in 1996 and 
his initial habeas petition, in which his claims were deemed 
defaulted, was dismissed in 2004, eight years before 
Martinez. 
 
 A movant’s diligence in pursuing review of his 
ineffective assistance claims is also an important factor.  
Where a movant has not exhausted available avenues of 
review, a court may deny relief under Rule 60(b)(6).  See id. 
at 537 (majority opinion); Lopez, 678 F.3d at 1136 & n.1; In 
re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 840 F.2d 188, 194-95 (3d Cir. 
1988). 
 
 A special consideration arises in this case, as well.  
Courts must treat with particular care claims raised in capital 
cases.  Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785 (1987) (“Our duty 
                                                                                                             
A.2d 435, 438 (Pa. 1975)—likely barring Cox from raising 
those claims in his allocatur petition. 
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to search for constitutional error with painstaking care is 
never more exacting than it is in a capital case.”).  Although 
Cox did not receive a capital sentence for the murder of 
Davis, that murder conviction was used as an aggravating 
factor in arriving at a death sentence in a separate case, albeit 
one that is still under habeas review.  That fact is significant. 
 
 Finally, we offer no opinion on the substantiality or 
lack thereof of Cox’s claims or how the District Court should 
weigh the various factors that may be pertinent to his Rule 
60(b)(6) motion.  Nor do we intimate that the Court is 
precluded from reaching the same conclusion on remand 
following a more comprehensive analysis.  We conclude only 
that, perhaps with additional briefing by the parties, a more 
explicit consideration of the facts and circumstances relevant 
to the concededly timely filed underlying motion would have 
been, and is now, appropriate. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 We will vacate the order of the District Court denying 
Cox’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.  If, following the 
proceedings on remand, an appeal is filed, that appeal shall be 
forwarded to this panel for decision. 
